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ABSTRACT
Transportation project prioritization uses performance measures that are related to the transportation asset, its
operations, and its environment. However, in the state of practice, evaluation does not consider directly the
likelihood of natural or man-made threats, the infrastructure resilience, or the consequences of the infrastructure
damage in the event that the threat occurs. Thus, during the prioritization of investments, assets of low security
do not receive the due attention they deserve. In defining security as the lack of risk of damage from threats due
to inherent structure or functional resilience, this paper is based on the premise that the inclusion of security
considerations in prioritization introduces a much needed element of robustness in investment prioritization
However, the inclusion of investment security impacts leads to an increase in the number of performance
measures for the investment evaluation. This paper presents a methodology to quantify the overall security level
for an asset in terms of the environmental threats it faces, its resilience or vulnerability to damage, and the
consequences of the infrastructure damage. The overall framework consists of the traditional steps in risk
management, and this paper's specific contribution is in the part of the framework that measures the risk. This
paper applies the methodology to a given set of assets by measuring the risk (security) of each asset and
prioritizing security investments across multiple assets using multiple criteria analysis.
1. INTRODUCTION
Disasters can result in millions and even billions of
dollars in damage. For example, Hurricane Sandy
caused about $50 billion in damages, and the
tsunami in Japan caused about $308 billion in
damages (Porter, 2013; Ridgwell, 2011). Additionally,
events such as the Paramount Boulevard Bridge
accident in California cost $40 million in damages
and repair, and the Leo Frigo Memorial Bridge Pier
failure cost $20 million in investigation and repair
costs (Tata, 2012; Phelps, 2013). The occurrence
and magnitude of these unexpected natural or manmade disasters cannot be predicted with absolute
certainty; however, if civil infrastructure systems can
be made to withstand better the potential damage
resulting from these disasters, the consequences
and costs of repair may be reduced.
Similar to all civil infrastructure systems,
transportation assets encounter end-of-life situations
when they face intended or unintended agents that
cause their destruction. Unintended termination can
be caused by the failure of the asset itself due to
factors including design flaws, fatigue, advanced
deterioration, and other internal causes, or due to
external agents such as overloading, accidents, or
natural events. Intended end-of-life events include

deliberate retirement due to structural or functional
obsolescence, terrorism, or vandalism. In any given
jurisdiction, there is a wide range of types of threats
to transportation infrastructure; however, if such
threats to each asset can be identified and if the
expected reduction in the asset damage due to
security-enhancing investments can be predicted,
then the reduction in the consequences of disaster
can be forecast for each type of level of the security
investment. When infrastructure is made resilient
through security investments, the consequences of
unintended end-of-life events can be reduced and
the infrastructure itself can play a role in mitigating or
recovering from the damage resulting from the
event.
There are five key steps to risk management that
should be considered to develop evidence for
security investments (Ezell, Farr, Wiese, 2000):


Measure the threat likelihood posed by
external or intentional threats to the asset



Monitor the threat likelihood over time



Assess the effectiveness of actions intended
to reduce consequences
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Communicate this information to the general
public and legislators



Provide evidence for appropriate resources

With the listed series of steps, a methodology to
quantify security enhances the list to ensure security
is of equal importance with respect to other
performance measures and further plays a key role
in determining asset prioritization for security
funding.
Of the five key steps in risk management for
reducing the overall negative impacts of
transportation infrastructure damage, the first step is
to measure the threat likelihood posed by forces
external to the asset. If historical data such as
earthquake occurrence or flooding tendency are
available, then (1) these threat probabilities can be
calculated to identify the areas of high threat
likelihood, (2) the threat likelihood can be monitored
over time to identify the optimal time of intervention,
and (3) the effectiveness of asset improvements can
be assessed in terms of the extent to which they can
reduce the adverse consequences if the threat does
occur. The fourth step involves communicating the
gathered information to serve as support material for
requesting funding purposely for investments geared
toward securing the infrastructure from damage.
With these steps, a case can be made to help
improve transportation infrastructure in terms of
security.
Furthermore, due to the uncertain nature of threats
(their occurrence and magnitudes cannot be
predicted with complete certainty [Dojutrek, 2014]), it
is vital to incorporate concepts of uncertainty in any
analysis that deals with risk prediction and security
investment
evaluation.
Failure
to
consider
uncertainty can lead to overestimation or
underestimation of the likelihood of the threat,
damage to the infrastructure, and consequences of
the damage to the community. Uncertainty can be
quantified by analyzing historical data trends and
developing models for threat likelihoods and
magnitudes, infrastructure damage due to the threat,
resilience enhancement due to the security
investments, and community consequences of threat
occurrence.
At the current time, the funding allocation processes
for transportation infrastructure at most agencies
utilize performance measures that include the
expected change in asset condition or remaining life,
land use, air quality, connectivity, and so on.
However, the impacts of competing investments on
asset security are rarely considered in a direct
manner. Thus, for assets that are located in an area
of high threat likelihood, their respective proposed
investments could help reduce the potential for
infrastructure damage (and the consequent adverse

impacts on the community). Current evaluation
processes do not account for such beneficial impacts
of the investments. As such, it is reasonable to argue
that a performance measure that quantifies the
security benefits (reduction of infrastructure damage
risk due to external threats) should be considered in
transportation
investment
evaluation
and
prioritization in general.
2. A REVIEW OF PAST WORK
Threat, vulnerability, and consequence information
are important in risk assessment. Risk management
includes a specification of which protective
measures must be undertaken based on an agreed
upon risk reduction strategy. The security industry
has been slow to use measurable factors in reducing
risk because of difficulties in establishing securityrelated metrics. As such, in the security industry, the
most widely-used approaches to analyze risks are
qualitative in nature in a bid to ensure that the lowervalued assets receive due consideration during the
evaluation process. Typically, qualitative assessment
assigns relative values to specific assets based on
factors such as the criticality of loss or replacement
costs. The threats against assets are also given a
relative value based on the probability of taking
place. The result is a risk equation that computes
risk as a function of impact and likelihood of
occurrence. The goal of a security design strategy
should be the logical and incremental “buy down” of
security risk so as to provide acceptable levels of
protection for transportation agency assets and
operations on a continuing basis (SAIC & PB
Consult, 2009).
The American Association of State Highway and
Transportation Officials (AASHTO) Vulnerability
Assessment method is a guide developed
specifically for transportation agencies to establish a
vulnerability assessment method based on
AASHTO’s guidelines. The methodology focuses on
subjectively assigning values to factors associated
with asset criticality and vulnerability. Asset criticality
and vulnerability scores are transformed into X and Y
coordinates, respectively, and plotted to determine
asset importance. Examples of criticality factors
range from Deter/Defend Factors to Consequence to
General Public Factors (AASHTO, 2002). Assets are
then prioritized based on the subjective values
assigned to each factor using the equation below.
∙ 100
Where x is the total criticality score for asset n, and
Cmax is the highest criticality score attainable.
Vulnerability
in
the
AASHTO
vulnerability
assessment is broken into three factors: Visibility and
Attendance, Access to the Asset, and Site Specific
Hazards (AASHTO, 2002). Each factor is broken into
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two subfactors and again given subjective values on
a scale of one to five. The subfactors for each main
factor are then multiplied together, and those results
are added together as seen in the equation below.
∙

∙

∙

Where A and B are subfactors of Factor 1, C and D
are subfactors of Factor 2, and E and F are
subfactors of Factor 3.
A vulnerability coordinate is derived for each asset
using the equation below.
∙ 100
Where Vmax is the highest attainable vulnerability
score and y is the vulnerability total score for asset n.

Figure 1. AASHTO vulnerability assessment chart

Threat
Likelihood

Resilience

Consequences

The assets are then plotted in the coordinate system
seen in Figure 1 and assets falling in Quadrant 1 of
the graph are labeled high priority.
In Figure 1, the Consequence Assessment is
assumed on the basis of the X and Y coordinates
and their factors and subfactors. The method
continues by listing possible countermeasures
broken down into countermeasure functions of deter,
detect, and defend to be considered for the assets
that fall in Quadrant 1. Again, choosing
countermeasures is a subjective process based on
the countermeasure functions and decision maker.
Finally, the countermeasures listed are assigned
rankings of high, medium, or low.
The above-explained AASHTO methodology for risk
management is quite subjective and uses surveys to
obtain data (Venna & Fricker, 2009). Additionally,
vulnerability and criticality are the only major factors
that are included in the method to determine asset
security importance, other important considerations,
such as the resilience of the infrastructure, are not
considered. Further, the method defines vulnerability
and criticality as separate entities; however, one
could argue that the concepts are not independent: if
an asset is vulnerable then it has high criticality, and
vice versa.
The CARVER + Shock methodology identifies seven
vulnerability
factors
(criticality,
accessibility,
recoverability, vulnerability, effect, recognizability,
and shock) and subjectively assigns a value on a
scale of zero to ten to each, then the overall score is
calculated as the sum of the scores assigned to the
seven criteria (NIICIE, 2007). It accounts for target
components of the target system and is applicable to
features outside of transportation. This methodology
is popular as local governments seek to leverage
simple analysis tools to derive security-related
information. It provides a “quick and dirty” means to
rank potential targets based on vulnerability.

Security
Rating

Optimization &
Prioritization

Multi‐criteria
Evaluation

Figure 2. Proposed methodology framework

However, McGill and Ayyub (2007) pointed out that
its additive and inherently nonprobabilistic nature
does not produce results that can support security
risk assessment.
The Costing Asset Protection for Transportation
Agencies (CAPTA) method identifies security-related
countermeasures for assets on the basis of the
extent of potential losses (SAIC & PB Consult,
2009). CAPTA uses a consequence-based
methodology that supports capital budgeting and
resource allocation. The main purpose of the method
is to reduce risks to a level manageable by operating
agencies based on their available budget and
resources. Consequence thresholds are established
subjectively for the risk factors that include the
potentially exposed population, property loss, and
mission disruption. This method is mainly a decision
informing tool for capital budgeting, not necessarily
an asset specific assessment tool for prioritizing
assets (SAIC & PB Consult, 2009).
3. METHODOLOGY
The proposed security rating developed in this study
has three main inputs: Threat Likelihood, Resilience,
and Consequence. The output is a security rating
index which will be used to help in prioritizing assets
for optimal security enhancement funding and used
in multicriteria evaluation (Figure 2 [Dojutrek, 2014]).
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Table 1. Terminology for methodology
Risk
Factors

Term

Definition

Target

Transportation asset that
has value to the owner or
users

Resilience

The ability of the asset to
withstand the threat

Threat

An unexpected natural,
unintentional man-made
or intentional man-made
event that causes
damage or disruption

Asset

Threat

The probability that the
threat occurs

Threat
Likelihood
Consequence

Figure 3. Threat likelihood factor versus resilience factor

The loss of an asset and
the effect of such loss to
the community

Consequence

The definitions of the key inputs and terminology used
in the paper are defined in Table 1 (Dojutrek, 2014).
Each of the three main factors, Threat Likelihood,
Resilience, and Consequence, have measures that
quantify how much the factor contributes to asset
security. Each measure is further broken into attributes
that indicate the level of the measure rated on a scale to
define the overall amount that the measure contributes
to the factor (Dojutrek, 2014). Since the attributes of
each measure have different units, the attribute data
was scaled to account for these differences.

Figure 4. Consequence factor versus resilience factor

Each risk factor follows the formulation below:
∙

⋯

∙

f = 1….f
n = 1…n
Where Ff is a risk factor for the transportation asset,
wn is the weight/importance of measure n, and Mn is
a measure of risk factor Ff.
Each measure of a risk factor follows the formulation
below:
∙… ∙
Where Mn is a measure of risk factor Ff; ss is an
attribute that contributes to the level of measure Mn,
rated on a scale to define the overall amount that
measure n contributes to the risk factor, Ff; and Ns is
the number of attributes associated with measure n.
The security rating function can take any one of
several forms. For example, addition, subtraction,
multiplication, or ratio. Also, there are several ways by
which they can be weighted. For purposes of this
study, the security rating equation is shown below.

Figure 5. Threat likelihood factor versus consequence factor

Where SRa is the Security Rating for asset a, FTLa is
the threat likelihood factor of asset a, α is the
exponential weight of the resilience factor, FCa is the
consequence factor of asset a, δ is the exponential
weight of the threat likelihood factor, FRa is the
resilience factor of asset a, and λ is the exponential
weight of the consequence factor.
As asset resilience increases and threat likelihood
and consequences decrease, the security rating
increases. The greater the security rating, the more
secure the asset is. Each factor can be graphed
against each other to identify assets of importance
as shown in Figures 3, 4, and 5.

34
Table 2. JFK Bridge threat likelihood factor data
Measure

Access to
Asset

Figure 6. 3-D representation of security rating factor
Location
Specific
Hazards

Attributes

Scale
d

Data

Env Barriers

Over river

3

Physical
Barriers

Roadway
underneath

3

Natural
Hazards

Earthquake
epicenter

1

County
Freeze
Index

30

1

County
Precipitation

45.84

5

Results

4.5

1.67

Table 3. JFK Bridge resilience factor data
Measure

Attributes

Data

Scaled

Results

Resistance

Condition

Deck: 6

2

12

Superstruct
ure: 5

3

Substructur
e: 6

2

Age

83 yrs

4

Const. Time

2yrs

4

Const. Cost

$45.2M

5

Asset Size

267,466 ft

Material

Continuous
steel

3

Design Type

Truss
Bridge

4

Figure 7. JFK Bridge, Jeffersonville, Indiana

Recoverability

Asset
Characteristics
Figure 8. Detailed framework for case study

Additionally, a three-dimensional representation can
also be derived from the three factors to show their
interactions (Figure 6).
4. CASE STUDY
To demonstrate the study methodology, the National
Bridge Inventory structure nr. 8868, the JFK Bridge
in Jeffersonville, Indiana, was used (Figure 7).
The factors, measures, and attributes used for the
case study are described in Figure 8.
The case study incorporated a number of
assumptions. First, the construction time was based
on the bridge size. Second, earthquakes were
identified as the threat, and the probability of
earthquake threat was equal to the amount of
historical earthquake epicenters found in the county
of location. Third, environmental barriers were
assumed to be the waterway under the bridge. The

2

41.
67

5
3.5

detour travel speed was assumed to be 45 mph, and
all weights in the security rating equation (α, δ, λ) and
in the risk factor equations were assumed to be equal.
Threat likelihood measures, attributes, and scales
can be seen in Table 2.
0.5 ∙ 3

0.5 ∙ 2.33

2.67

Where FTL is the threat likelihood risk factor.
The threat likelihood factor was calculated to be
2.67. The resilience measures, attributes, and scales
are listed in Table 3. The resilience factor was
calculated to be 19.2.
0.33 ∙ 12

0.33 ∙ 41.67

0.33 ∙ 3.5

19.2

Where FR is the resilience risk factor.
The consequence measures, attributes, and scales
are listed in Table 4. The consequence factor was
calculated to be 4.29.
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Table 4. JFK Bridge consequence factor data
Scaled

Results

Jeffersonville:
27,362
Clark County:
96,472

3

3

AADT

15,200

2

Replacem
ent Cost

$36.1M

4

EDMC
Value

$18.63M

4

Detour
Length
(miles)

3.11

2

Inc in
travel time
due to
detour

4.15 min

2

Measure

Attributes

Potentially
Exposed
Population

Population

Property
Loss

Mission
Disruption

Data

8

2
Figure 10. Spatial representation of overall risks for a section of
Indiana bridges using security rating

0.33 ∙ 3

0.33 ∙ 8

0.33 ∙ 2

4.29

Where FC is the consequence risk factor.
The overall Security Rating of the JFK Bridge is then
3.03, which indicates a security rating of “medium”:
19.2
2.67
4.29
Figure 9. Tentative security rating scale
Table 5. Interpretation of security rating
Security
Rating

Example Interpretation

≤ 0.21

Indicates a great need for security improvement of the
asset. The asset has generally very low security thus
immediate action should be undertaken to enhance its
resilience and thus to reduce the possible
consequences of threats.
Indicates significant need for security improvement
needs of the asset. For this asset, the agency should be
poised to undertake actions in the very near future, to
enhance resilience and thus to reduce possible
consequences of the asset failure.
Indicates medium-to-high security improvement needs.
Facilities within this range can be monitored at a
frequency slightly exceeding standard frequency. The
risk of failure can be tolerated until a normal capital
project (to enhance resilience and thus reduce
consequences, among other benefits) is carried out.
Indicates low-to-medium security improvement needs.
Unexpected failure can be avoided during the remaining
service life of the asset by performing standard
scheduled inspections with due attention to specific
design features that influence the assets possible
consequences.
Indicates low security improvement need. Often
reflective of the likelihood of threat to a civil engineering
system built to the current design standards in a low
threat likelihood environment.
Indicates little or zero security improvement needs.

0.25 –
0.21

0.40–
0.25

0.95–
0.40

3.03–
0.95

11–3.03

2.76

The security rating can be placed on a tentative
scale and interpretations made, as seen in Figure 9
and Table 5.
Spatial analysis can be carried out to further
enhance visualization of the security rating (see
Figure 10, produced using GIS ArcMap 10.1).
5. SECURITY INVESTMENT AND
PRIORITIZATION
Multicriteria decision making uses any of several
alternative methods, including cost effectiveness,
economic efficiency, the factor rating method, or the
analytic hierarchy process. The cost effectiveness
can be measured in terms of the increase in security
rating or postproject security rating due to a security
investment (Dojutrek, 2014). Economic efficiency
can be calculated using the net present value,
present worth of costs, or the benefit cost ratio. The
factor rating method ranks different criteria based on
subjective weighting. The analytic hierarchy process
uses matrix multiplication of criteria weights to each
alternative weight to derive the best option.
The evaluation criteria for security investment
involve certain specific considerations. Effectiveness
can be measured by increased infrastructure
resilience
and/or
decreased
consequences
(Dojutrek, 2014). Costs can be measured in terms of
agency costs (damage costs and repair costs) and
user costs (travel time increase and detours). To
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measure security, the security rating described in this
paper can be used for infrastructure as is, as an
increase
in
security
rating
after
security
improvements and as a final security rating after
improvements have been done (Dojutrek, 2014).
To incorporate the security rating into multicriteria
evaluation as a performance measure, the security
rating can be used for the asset in its current state
as a generic performance measure that is the same
for each project alternative (Table 6), as an “increase
in security rating” that is alternative-specific and
different for each proposed improvement (Table 7),
and as a “final security rating” which is again
alternative-specific and based on the enhancement
to security that the improvement provides (Table 8).
Each of these methods will prioritize security
improvement alternatives based on the specific
performance measure chosen.
The existing security rating prioritization indicates
assets with low security rating scores to be of high
importance and, therefore, in need of improvements.
In the example in Table 6, Asset 2, with the lowest
security rating, would be prioritized for further
improvement needs.
The increase in security rating prioritization indicates
the asset and associated alternative improvement
with the greatest increase in security for an asset. In
the example in Table 7, Asset 2 would be the most
beneficial choice because of the alternative’s high
increase in security rating for the asset.
The final security rating prioritization indicates the
asset and alternative with the greatest security rating
after an improvement. In the example in Table 8,
Asset 3 would be the alternative that gives the
overall highest security rating after improvement.
Additionally, security can be incorporated into
multicriteria evaluation by including security as one
of the various performance measures used to
evaluate transportation infrastructure. Example
performance measure criteria are listed below.
Traditionally, the performance measures that are
used in evaluation include: air quality, noise,
economic efficiency, economic development, travel
time, safety, vehicle operating cost, and connectivity.
This paper argues that it is feasible and reasonable
to add security as one of the multiple criteria in
transportation investment evaluation, prioritization,
and decision making. Secondly, for transportation
investments specifically geared towards security
enhancement, the framework presented in this paper
could be used; for doing this, both the costs and the
benefits (or effectiveness, in terms of the security
rating increase) of the security project should be
estimated. This paper addressed the benefits
perspective.

Table 6. Simple example of existing security rating prioritization

Asset

Existing
Security Rating
(ESR)

Priority Rank on the Basis of
Existing Security Rating

3.22
2.45

2
1

5.65

3

Asset 1
Asset 2
Asset 3
Asset 4
Asset 5

7.40

5

10.23

6

Asset 6

6.89

4

Table 7. Simple example of increase in security rating
prioritization
Asset

Improvement

1

ESR

1

ISR
(∆SR)

Rank
of
ESR

Rank of
ISR

Bridge Deck
3.22
4.57
2
4
Overlay
Bridge
Asset 2
Substructure
2.45
8.30
1
1
Maintenance
Bridge
Asset 3
5.65
7.22
3
2
Rehabilitation
Asset 4
Bridge Painting
7.40
0.52
5
6
Added Travel
Asset 5
10.23 1.32
6
5
Lane on Bridge
Bridge
Asset 6
Superstructure
6.89
4.88
4
3
Replacement
1
ESR: Existing Security Rating; ISR: Increase in Security Rating
Asset 1

Table 8. Simple example of final security rating prioritization

Asset

Improvement

ESR

ISR
(∆SR)

FSR
(SR +
∆SR)

Rank
of
ESR

Rank
of
ISR

Rank
of
FSR

Asset
1

Bridge Deck
Overlay

3.22

4.57

7.79

2

4

6

Asset
2

Bridge
Substructure
Maintenance

2.45

8.30

10.75

1

1

4

Asset
3

Bridge
Rehabilitation

5.65

7.22

12.87

3

2

1

Asset
4

Bridge Painting

7.40

0.52

7.92

5

6

5

Asset
5

Added Travel
Lane on Bridge

10.23

1.32

11.55

6

5

3

Asset
6

Bridge
Superstructure
Replacement

6.89

4.88

11.77

4

3

2

6. CONCLUSION
Prioritization of transportation assets typically utilizes
performance
measures
related
to
asset
characteristics,
operations,
and
surrounding
environment. The environmental criteria generally do
not take into consideration asset security which can
be stated as a function of the likelihood and
magnitude, resilience of the transportation asset,
and the resulting consequence in the event of the
treat. Therefore, low security assets do not receive
the due consideration they deserve during project
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prioritization. This paper presented a methodology to
quantify the overall security level for an asset, using
a case study, in terms of the threat likelihood, system
resilience, and consequences in the event of system
destruction or damage due to the threat occurrence.
The paper's methodology addresses the risk
measurement aspect of the traditional risk
management framework. The paper applies the
methodology to measure the security of a prominent
transportation asset in Indiana. Finally, the paper
shows how security rating can be used in multiple
criteria investment evaluation for multiple assets.
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